Small Lots, Mixed Use Planning

by

Adam Bond, Archi­tec­tur­al Preservationist

The post-war Amer­i­can plan­ning exper­i­ment in sin­gle-use zon­ing, lot con­sol­i­da­tion, and large-scale devel­op­ment has now had sev­en­ty years to demon­strate its out­comes. The demon­stra­tion has not been favor­able. Cities that restruc­tured them­selves around these prin­ci­ples — clear­ing mixed-use neigh­bor­hood fab­ric for high­ways, con­sol­i­dat­ing fine-grained lots into superblocks, sep­a­rat­ing res­i­den­tial from com­mer­cial and indus­tri­al use by reg­u­la­to­ry fiat — have pro­duced built envi­ron­ments that are eco­nom­i­cal­ly frag­ile, social­ly seg­re­gat­ed, envi­ron­men­tal­ly waste­ful, and phys­i­cal­ly dete­ri­o­rat­ing on a cycle that pro­duces repeat­ed demands for pub­lic invest­ment to address the con­se­quences of the orig­i­nal design choices.

The eco­nom­ic resilience argu­ment for fine-grained lot struc­ture — the argu­ment that small lots dis­trib­uted among many own­ers are more resilient to eco­nom­ic shocks than con­sol­i­dat­ed lots owned by few­er enti­ties — has been devel­oped most rig­or­ous­ly by the Strong Towns orga­ni­za­tion and its aca­d­e­m­ic col­lab­o­ra­tors, and it rests on a straight­for­ward prin­ci­ple from risk the­o­ry: dis­trib­uted sys­tems fail local­ly while con­sol­i­dat­ed sys­tems fail sys­tem­i­cal­ly. A block of 20 row hous­es owned by 20 dif­fer­ent peo­ple is a block on which any indi­vid­ual fail­ure — one own­er’s bank­rupt­cy, one prop­er­ty’s dete­ri­o­ra­tion, one vacan­cy — is iso­lat­ed and bound­ed. The adja­cent 19 prop­er­ties are unaf­fect­ed. The block­’s char­ac­ter, its tax base, and its neigh­bor­hood func­tion continue.

The same block of land con­sol­i­dat­ed into a sin­gle 20-unit apart­ment build­ing owned by one enti­ty con­cen­trates all of these risks. A sin­gle over­lever­aged investor, a sin­gle mechan­i­cal fail­ure, a sin­gle mar­ket shift can com­pro­mise all 20 units simul­ta­ne­ous­ly. The post-war pub­lic hous­ing projects whose demo­li­tion has cost tens of bil­lions of pub­lic dol­lars since the 1990s — the Cabri­ni-Greens, the Pruitt-Igoes, the Robert Tay­lor Homes — were not archi­tec­tur­al fail­ures in the nar­row sense. They were struc­tur­al fail­ures: build­ings whose size, design, and own­er­ship con­cen­tra­tion cre­at­ed con­di­tions under which indi­vid­ual prob­lem-solv­ing was impos­si­ble and sys­temic dete­ri­o­ra­tion was inevitable once the lev­el of pub­lic sub­sidy required to main­tain them was with­drawn. Hous­ing author­i­ties have demol­ished over 200,000 such units since the mid-1990s, accord­ing to Plan­e­ti­zen’s 2024 analy­sis, destroy­ing the hous­ing stock pre­cise­ly because the con­sol­i­dat­ed mod­el failed — and fail­ing, in many cas­es, to pro­vide equiv­a­lent replace­ment units for the res­i­dents displaced.

The Strong Towns analy­sis extends this resilience argu­ment to the fis­cal dimen­sion. Large-scale con­sol­i­dat­ed devel­op­ment — the sub­ur­ban strip, the block-scaled mixed-use project, the big box retail com­plex — gen­er­ates high tax rev­enue per acre in its ear­ly years but impos­es infra­struc­ture main­te­nance lia­bil­i­ties that far exceed that rev­enue over the full life­cy­cle of the devel­op­ment. The fine-grained, incre­men­tal­ly devel­oped his­toric urban fab­ric, by con­trast, gen­er­ates mod­est but sta­ble tax rev­enue with infra­struc­ture main­te­nance costs that are spread over many prop­er­ties and many years, pro­duc­ing a more sus­tain­able fis­cal rela­tion­ship between devel­op­ment and pub­lic infra­struc­ture. The fis­cal insol­ven­cy of Amer­i­can sub­ur­ban devel­op­ment is not a bug in the sys­tem. It is a design fea­ture of a devel­op­ment mod­el that was nev­er expect­ed to pay for itself over its full lifecycle.

The sep­a­ra­tion of res­i­den­tial from com­mer­cial and indus­tri­al uses — the foun­da­tion­al move of post­war zon­ing — was not a polit­i­cal­ly neu­tral act. As his­to­ri­ans of Amer­i­can plan­ning includ­ing Richard Roth­stein (The Col­or of Law, 2017) and Robert Fogel­son (Bour­geois Night­mares, 2005) have doc­u­ment­ed, sin­gle-fam­i­ly zon­ing was adopt­ed in Amer­i­can cities in the ear­ly and mid-20th cen­tu­ry not mere­ly to sep­a­rate incom­pat­i­ble land uses but specif­i­cal­ly to main­tain racial and class seg­re­ga­tion in res­i­den­tial neigh­bor­hoods. The sep­a­ra­tion of uses had the sec­ondary effect of sep­a­rat­ing access to com­mer­cial ser­vices by income and car own­er­ship — an effect that was tol­er­a­ble to the auto­mo­bile-own­ing major­i­ty and dev­as­tat­ing to the car-free minority.

The con­se­quences of this sep­a­ra­tion for low-income house­holds have been exten­sive­ly doc­u­ment­ed by trans­porta­tion researchers. Fam­i­lies in the low­est income quin­tile spend approx­i­mate­ly 42 per­cent of their house­hold income on trans­porta­tion, accord­ing to Smart Growth Amer­i­ca’s analy­sis of Amer­i­can Com­mu­ni­ty Sur­vey data — more than twice the pro­por­tion spent by mid­dle-income house­holds. This dis­par­i­ty is direct­ly relat­ed to the land use pat­terns that make car own­er­ship nec­es­sary: when dai­ly goods and ser­vices are acces­si­ble only by car, house­holds that can­not afford cars are com­pelled to spend a dis­pro­por­tion­ate share of their income on vehi­cle own­er­ship and oper­a­tion, or to go with­out. In Allen­town, where medi­an house­hold income places many fam­i­lies in finan­cial con­texts where the full annu­al cost of car own­er­ship (AAA esti­mat­ed $10,728 in 2023) rep­re­sents a very sig­nif­i­cant frac­tion of take-home pay, this is not a mar­gin­al equi­ty concern.

The restora­tion of as-of-right mixed-use zon­ing — the per­mis­sion to oper­ate a small com­mer­cial use in a ground-floor space in a res­i­den­tial neigh­bor­hood, with­out requir­ing a spe­cial excep­tion or vari­ance — direct­ly address­es this equi­ty prob­lem by mak­ing dai­ly goods and ser­vices acces­si­ble on foot. A 2024 Strong Towns analy­sis of what they call the “cor­ner store” prob­lem doc­u­ment­ed that thou­sands of for­mer com­mer­cial build­ings in res­i­den­tial neigh­bor­hoods across Amer­i­ca’s old­er cities are now legal­ly pro­hib­it­ed from oper­at­ing as com­mer­cial estab­lish­ments by zon­ing codes adopt­ed decades after the build­ings were con­struct­ed. The phys­i­cal infra­struc­ture for a more walk­a­ble, car-option­al dai­ly life exists in these build­ings; the reg­u­la­to­ry infra­struc­ture pro­hibits its use.

PlaceEco­nom­ics’ urban vital­i­ty research has doc­u­ment­ed a con­sis­tent rela­tion­ship between intact his­toric build­ing fab­ric and small busi­ness vital­i­ty across mul­ti­ple Amer­i­can cities. Their analy­sis of Nashville’s his­toric dis­tricts found that busi­ness­es in his­toric dis­tricts had sig­nif­i­cant­ly high­er sur­vival rates than com­pa­ra­ble busi­ness­es in non-his­toric areas, and that the den­si­ty of small busi­ness­es per block was high­er in his­toric dis­tricts than in adja­cent areas with new­er, larg­er build­ings. Their San Diego analy­sis (released in 2025) found that 40 per­cent of all apart­ment prop­er­ties in that city’s his­toric dis­tricts are locat­ed in areas cov­er­ing a small frac­tion of the city’s land area — demon­strat­ing that his­toric dis­tricts achieve den­si­ty at a human scale with­out requir­ing the con­sol­i­da­tion and large-foot­print devel­op­ment that his­toric preser­va­tion is fre­quent­ly accused of blocking.

The mech­a­nism con­nect­ing his­toric build­ing fab­ric to small busi­ness vital­i­ty is large­ly explained by rent eco­nom­ics. Old build­ings have low­er struc­tur­al costs: their con­struc­tion debt is long retired, their ener­gy sys­tems may be less effi­cient but their struc­tur­al shells require no amor­ti­za­tion, and their small­er foot­prints pro­duce small­er absolute rent oblig­a­tions. The eco­nom­ics of small-scale com­mer­cial ten­an­cy — the cor­ner bar­ber­shop, the neigh­bor­hood bak­ery, the small law office, the inde­pen­dent book­store — are viable in these small­er, low­er-rent spaces and unvi­able in the new­ly con­struct­ed large-for­mat com­mer­cial spaces whose high con­struc­tion costs require high rent to ser­vice. Jane Jacobs made this argu­ment in The Death and Life of Great Amer­i­can Cities in 1961, and the empir­i­cal research of the inter­ven­ing six­ty years has not refut­ed it. His­toric build­ings are not mere­ly cul­tur­al­ly impor­tant; they are eco­nom­i­cal­ly nec­es­sary for the small-scale com­mer­cial ecol­o­gy that makes urban neigh­bor­hoods livable.

The for­mal lot con­sol­i­da­tion that zon­ing review can reg­u­late is not the only mech­a­nism through which the fine-grain resilience of a neigh­bor­hood’s own­er­ship struc­ture can be under­mined. Port­fo­lio land­lordism — the acqui­si­tion of large num­bers of indi­vid­ual small prop­er­ties by a sin­gle invest­ment enti­ty — pro­duces the func­tion­al equiv­a­lent of lot con­sol­i­da­tion with­out trig­ger­ing any reg­u­la­to­ry review. A port­fo­lio investor who owns 200 row hous­es in Allen­town makes cen­tral­ized deci­sions about main­te­nance, ren­o­va­tion, and dis­po­si­tion that affect the neigh­bor­hood the way a sin­gle con­sol­i­dat­ed build­ing own­er’s deci­sions would, but with­out the trans­paren­cy or account­abil­i­ty that attach­es to a sin­gle large property.

The evi­dence on port­fo­lio land­lordis­m’s effects on neigh­bor­hood sta­bil­i­ty is mixed in aggre­gate but con­cern­ing in its dis­tri­b­u­tion­al con­se­quences. Research by the Urban Insti­tute and the Nation­al Hous­ing Preser­va­tion Data­base doc­u­ments that large port­fo­lio investors in rental hous­ing con­sis­tent­ly spend less on main­te­nance per unit than own­er-occu­pants or small land­lords, pro­duce high­er rates of code vio­la­tions, and are more like­ly to sell or aban­don prop­er­ties dur­ing eco­nom­ic down­turns, pre­cise­ly the con­di­tions under which neigh­bor­hood sta­bil­i­ty is most frag­ile. The con­cen­tra­tion of rental port­fo­lio own­er­ship in post-indus­tri­al cities like Allen­town — where prop­er­ty val­ues and rents are low­er, mak­ing port­fo­lio acqui­si­tion finan­cial­ly attrac­tive to investors seek­ing yield — cre­ates con­di­tions of struc­tur­al vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty that are invis­i­ble in stan­dard plan­ning data because they do not involve changes to the phys­i­cal lot struc­ture that zon­ing reg­u­la­tions track.

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